A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION….Brian Weatherson and

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION….Brian Weatherson and Matt Yglesias have read the Hall and Paul preemption paper and have some comments. So do I. Specifically, I have a question about the third sentence of the paper:

But as is typical in philosophy, deep intuitive familiarity has not led to any philosophical account of causation that is at once clean, precise, and widely agreed upon.

My question is this: is it safe to say that there is a clean, precise, and widely agreed upon belief that there is no subject in the philosophical world on which there is a clean, precise, and widely agreed upon belief? Or not?

And how, exactly, do Hall and Paul define “clean,” “precise,” and “widely agreed upon”? Until I get answers to these questions, I’m afraid I won’t be able to read any further in the paper.

UPDATE: I thought I was just making a lame joke here about a well known paradox in set theory, but Brian Weatherson actually has a serious point to make about all this.

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