Donald Trump’s abandonment of Ukraine in favor of Russia and Vladimir Putin threatens to upend the global order. Will Europe emerge as a unified force to defend Western democracies in the absence of American leadership? Washington Monthly editor-in-chief Paul Glastris speaks with Tamar Jacoby, Director of the New Ukraine Project at the Progressive Policy Institute; and Mike Lofgren, author, historian and a leading expert on military weapons systems.
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Below is a transcript of their conversation lightly edited for clarity:
Paul Glastris:
Welcome, Tamar and Mike. I’m so glad we could get all three of us together—I don’t think that’s happened before. You’ve both been thoughtful contributors to the Washington Monthly and close observers of Ukraine and the U.S. military. Tamar, you’re reporting from the ground, and so much is happening—most of it, frankly, pretty grim. Ukraine recently lost Kursk, a region it reclaimed about a year ago. The Trump administration has swung wildly—cutting off intelligence, halting arms deliveries, then reversing course.
There’s talk of a “peace process,” but it seems Trump wants to restructure the NATO command system and give up the key post of Supreme Allied Commander. I have my own views—I think it’s nuts—but you two are the experts. Let’s start with you, Tamar. You’ve written in both Washington Monthly and Forbes that Ukrainian troops were so frustrated under Biden’s cautious pace of weapons deliveries that many actually welcomed Trump, hoping he’d be more decisive. That’s no longer the case. Tell us what’s changed.
Tamar Jacoby:
That’s right. The belief was surprisingly widespread—among soldiers and civilians alike. In the months leading up to the election, I’d warn people about what was coming, and they’d respond, “We’re not so sure. Trump will be more decisive.” That was the phrase I kept hearing. The feeling was that Biden had given Ukraine just enough to keep fighting, but not enough to win, and that strategy wore people down. They hoped Trump would be different—that he’d recognize the threat of an expansionist Russia and step up. Almost no one saw the train wreck ahead. Now, of course, there’s deep disillusionment.
Ukrainians are famously resilient, but anxiety is rising. I’ve noticed more frustration, fear, and defiance. Just this week, I spoke with three soldiers who said they’re committed to the fight, no matter what Trump does.
Paul Glastris:
How did they get Trump so wrong? Don’t they read the American press? He’s never shown signs he’d be better for Ukraine.
Tamar Jacoby:
You’re right. But the frustration with Biden was intense, and many Ukrainians didn’t really know Trump. It was less about facts than about hope.
Paul Glastris:
Sounds a bit like the American working class blaming Biden for everything and throwing their support behind Trump out of desperation.
Tamar Jacoby:
Exactly. It’s the same dynamic—hope distorting reality.
Paul Glastris:
Mike, you’ve been tracking this closely and wrote for us about Europe potentially stepping up as the U.S. retreats. Can you walk us through your thinking?
Mike Lofgren:
Sure. What’s remarkable is that Europe, broadly speaking, had no illusions about Trump—yet the Ukrainians, with the most at stake, did. That shows how even those most affected by global politics can misread the situation.
Europe now understands it’s largely on its own. This marks the biggest geopolitical shift since World War II—perhaps since 1941, when the U.S. committed to preventing a hegemon from dominating Europe. That policy is being abandoned.
But Europe—including Canada and the UK—has an economy roughly equal to the U.S. There’s no physical reason they can’t provide arms. The obstacles are mostly political. That said, there are critical shortfalls, especially in air defense and intelligence. This is now a war of artillery shells and drones. Ukraine is producing more of its own, and Europe supplies about 25% of their equipment. I believe Europe can close the gap—if internal politics don’t sabotage the effort.
Tamar Jacoby:
I don’t disagree on the stakes or urgency, but it will be harder than it sounds. Intelligence and air defenses are vital. When the U.S. intel feed was cut, Ukraine’s capabilities were crippled. Missiles can hit Kyiv in under 10 minutes. Without U.S. Patriots and Starlink, the city is dangerously exposed.
Europe’s defense sector is fragmented. A good metaphor: a researcher tried traveling across Europe by train to study defense readiness, but the trains didn’t connect—French to German, German to others. He had to fly. It’s the same with weapons manufacturing. The need is real, and political will is growing—but money alone won’t solve the problem.
Mike Lofgren:
Absolutely. And Europe’s internal politics are tricky. Far-right parties under Moscow’s sway are gaining ground. There’s also been sabotage in Europe—underreported here—that could either unite the continent or set it on a path toward appeasement.
Paul Glastris:
Mike, in your piece you noted that political support often rises during moments of national crisis—like in Canada. Could Europe rally in the same way?
Tamar Jacoby:
Yes, I think Europe is increasingly willing. But progress won’t be linear. In Germany, for example, while the AfD has gained strength, the current government is pushing ahead with what could amount to a trillion dollars in new spending—half on infrastructure, half on defense. Three billion for Ukraine could be released as soon as tomorrow. So, as Mike said, the threat has concentrated minds. But getting over logistical hurdles remains the challenge.
Paul Glastris:
And I’ll note there was a story in The Atlantic just the other day reporting that Trump’s abandonment of Ukraine and his tariff hikes have actually weakened support for the far right in parts of Europe.
Tamar Jacoby:
That makes sense.
Mike Lofgren:
Well, we live in hope. If there’s a silver lining, it’s that Europe—especially places like Germany, where the economy is struggling—might rally around a common cause. Call it military Keynesianism. A new European identity could emerge from this. The dream of Europe has been dormant since Maastricht. People grumble, “What is Brussels doing for me?”—just like Americans complain about Washington. But when a tornado hits, suddenly Washington matters. If Putin’s knocking at the door, European unity might start to matter again too.
Tamar Jacoby:
Yes—and beyond political will, we have to consider the nuts and bolts. I think it was last year, maybe the year before, that half of all European defense spending still went to the U.S. Europe’s most vital systems—like long-range missiles—depend on American components. You can’t just strip those out; they’re built into the wiring. U.S. licensing can block their use. Even weapons need software updates—if those stop, the systems fail. And NATO’s command structure isn’t just one American general. It’s a whole ecosystem of American-led planning and coordination. Replacing that won’t be easy.
Mike Lofgren:
Exactly. And the press often brushes past this. It’s not just a “logistics” problem. If the U.S. gives up command, who steps in? The French don’t want a German; the Germans don’t want a Frenchman. Suddenly we’ve got another geopolitical headache.
Tamar Jacoby:
Great point.
Paul Glastris:
I’ll nominate Greece. I’m Greek, so—
Tamar Jacoby:
There you go. But seriously, what’s important here is that Mike and I agree: this has to happen. Europe has to step up. We both believe it can happen—we’re just flagging the major hurdles we’ll be watching over the next year or so.
Mike Lofgren:
Yes.
Paul Glastris:
So for an American watching this unfold—what should they hope for? My read is that Trump is angling to cut a fast deal that sells out Ukraine to Russia. But what’s stopping him is Russia itself. Putin doesn’t want a deal yet. He’s playing for time, thinking he can win more ground while U.S. support wanes. Do you both see it that way?
Tamar Jacoby:
Exactly. After the latest call, we see three possibilities. First, Trump could double down and pressure Putin—unlikely. We’ve never seen him take that line. And Putin doesn’t want peace; advancing on the battlefield benefits him. Second, Trump could fully sell out Ukraine—a real possibility. Or third, he could just walk away, like he did with North Korea. The peace process got too complicated, and he lost interest. That third option—Trump getting bored—might be the best-case scenario right now.
Mike Lofgren:
Remember Infrastructure Week?
Tamar Jacoby:
[Laughs] Exactly. And here’s the thing: American leadership is incredibly powerful. If it’s benign, of course we should want it. But if it becomes dangerous or destructive, I’d rather see it diminished than unleashed at any cost.
Mike Lofgren:
I agree completely. The best outcome now—if you’re a rational, decent American—is for Europe to quickly organize itself as a counterweight to tyranny. If it doesn’t, we’ll see nations rush for the exits. We’ll see nuclear proliferation on a scale we’ve never experienced—and not just in Europe. East Asia is watching closely.
Tamar Jacoby:
We’re already seeing signs of preparation and talk.
Mike Lofgren:
Exactly. Allies in Asia know Trump could cut a deal with Xi tomorrow. They’re watching how he treats Europe—and they know they’re next.
Paul Glastris:
Christian Caryl has a piece in the next issue of Washington Monthly that lays it out. Xi could use this moment to take Taiwan militarily. That would mean taking out Guam first—our closest base. Every simulation of a Chinese invasion begins with an attack on Guam. Suddenly you’ve got another Pearl Harbor.
Mike Lofgren:
Guam’s had a big bullseye on it for years now.
Paul Glastris:
So here’s a way to frame it: Trump is wielding America’s immense power to serve his own agenda—but that agenda will ultimately diminish America’s power in the world.
Tamar Jacoby:
No question. But what is his agenda? That’s what I can’t figure out. Is it about business? Money? Does he just admire autocrats? Or is there something darker we haven’t uncovered?
Mike Lofgren:
Same question goes for Putin. But I’d argue that behavior matters more than motivation. And Trump’s behavior shows he’s acting in Putin’s interests. That’s what we should focus on.
Tamar Jacoby:
Fair enough. No question. I agree.
Paul Glastris:
So to return to Tamar’s formulation—three possible paths ahead: one, Trump increases pressure on Putin (unlikely); two, he sells out Ukraine entirely; three, he gets distracted and moves on. That third option—distraction—may be what we should all hope for. If support for Ukraine continues quietly at a sustainable level while Trump focuses on other shiny objects—like cutting Medicaid—it might buy Europe the time it needs to get its act together.
Tamar Jacoby:
I agree. And don’t forget Ukraine’s own military industrial base is rapidly evolving. Drone warfare is transforming everything, and Ukraine is on the cutting edge. So is Russia, of course, but Ukraine’s production has come a long way. They still can’t make Patriots or battle tanks, and they can’t stand alone. But with European help—and Russia’s economy stagnating—we could thread the needle. The real danger would be if Trump lifts sanctions.
Paul Glastris:
Right. And Europe has tanks, it has fighter jets—
Tamar Jacoby:
But not enough. That’s the problem. They have everything—but not enough. And they lack the surge capacity. In the modern era, it’s harder to ramp up production fast. Even America struggled.
Paul Glastris:
Mike wrote a whole piece for us last summer on our inability to produce 155mm artillery shells.
Tamar Jacoby:
Exactly. And Europe faces the same challenge. The numbers are striking: from 2023 to 2024, Europe set a goal of producing one million 155mm shells for Ukraine. They fell short. North Korea, by contrast, supplied six million. That’s a tiny economy—but one built for war production.
So again, I’m not saying Europe can’t do this. I hope and pray it will. But it won’t be eas
Paul Glastris:
And I’ll just say again: what you both laid out—the three paths, the stakes for Ukraine, and the challenge for Europe—is vital for Americans to hear. Because even if we’re retreating from the world stage, the world isn’t retreating from us.
Tamar Jacoby:
Right. And it’s not just about Ukraine’s survival. It’s about the entire security architecture we’ve built over decades. Pulling out that keystone could bring the whole thing down.
Mike Lofgren:
Yes—and if that happens, it won’t stop with Europe. You’ll see countries around the globe rethinking their alliances, developing their own nuclear capabilities, preparing for a world where the U.S. is no longer a reliable partner.
Tamar Jacoby:
We’re already seeing some of that. And you can’t really blame them. If you’re sitting in Seoul or Tokyo or Warsaw and watching the U.S. abandon its commitments in Ukraine, what conclusions are you going to draw?
Paul Glastris:
Exactly. This is one of those moments where history accelerates. And it’s easy to miss it in the noise of daily politics—but we’ll look back and realize how consequential this period was.
Mike Lofgren:
And it won’t be about who had the best one-liner on cable news or the biggest rally. It’ll be about who had the foresight to build—or rebuild—institutions that can stand up to autocracy.
Tamar Jacoby:
That’s the hope. That Europe rises to the occasion. That Ukraine endures. And that the U.S., in whatever form, remembers what real leadership means.
Paul Glastris:
Amen to that. Tamar, Mike—thank you again. Let’s do this again soon. And listeners, stay tuned—there’s more coverage coming in the next issue of the Washington Monthly. You won’t want to miss it.
Mike Lofgren:
Thanks, Paul.
Tamar Jacoby:
Thanks so much. Looking forward to next time.
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